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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Electronic Eavesdropping - Recorded bribe
attempt admissible at bribery trial at which agent, to whom the at-
tempted bribe was made, testified - Rights under fourth amendment
not violated where electronic device was not planted by an unlawful
physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area.
Lopez v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1381 (1963).
An Internal Revenue agent, while investigating a possible tax delin-
quency, was allegedly offered a bribe by petitioner to conceal peti-
tioner's tax liability. The agent feigned acceptance, received money
and was invited to return in three days. After reporting the attempted
bribe to his supervisors the agent was instructed to follow through
with the original plan. Three days later, after having been equipped
with a pocket recorder, the agent returned to petitioner's office. The
agent and petitioner spoke of the original meeting and petitioner con-
firmed the first bribe attempt. Further, the agent received more
money and received promises of additional gratuities. Each act of
attempted bribery was allegedly designed to influence the agent in
concealing tax due by petitioner. Petitioner was later indicted on four
counts of attempted bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201,1 and was
subsequently found guilty on three of the four counts. Prior to and
during trial, petitioner had filed a motion to suppress the recording
as evidence, 2 claiming such recording was obtained in violation of his
1. 18 U.S.C. § 201 provides:
Whoever promises, offers, or gives any money or thing of
value . . . to any officer or employee or person acting for or on
behalf of the United States, or any department or agency thereof,
in any official function... with intent to influence his decision or
action on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may
by law be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his
place of trust or profit, or with intent to influence him to commit
or aid in committing, or to collude in, or allow, any fraud, or
make opportunity for the commission of any fraud, on the
United States, or to induce him to do or omit to do any act in
violation of his lawful duty, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned
S.. or both.
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(e), provides:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may
move ... for the return of the property and to suppress for use
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rights under the fourth amendment. 3 Petitioner asserted that the
agent never intended to accept the bribe and therefore had gained
access to his office by ruse and that petitioner's oral statements were
illegally seized. The motions were denied and the agent's recording
was admitted into evidence. The agent also testified as to his conver-
sations with petitioner. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed. 4 Certiorari was granted and in a divided opinion the United
States Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantees of the
fourth amendment are not such as would prohibit the use of an elec-
tronic recording device secretly carried into one's domain by an
avowed federal agent who had been there by invitation of the owner
or occupant of the premises.
The decision in Lopez was bound to follow the decisions which pre-
ceded it. Regarded as controlling by the Court were Olmstead v.
United States,5 On Lee v. United States,6 Goldman v. United States'
and Silverman v. United States.8 The instant case, however, should
not be construed as buttressing or reaffirming its predecessors.
In the Olmstead case 9 evidence of a conspiracy was obtained by
federal agents secretly tapping telephone company lines connected to
the main office and residences of the conspirators. The connections
were made in the basement of a large public building and on public
streets. No physical entry was made into the office or homes of any
of the conspirators. The Court held that obtaining the evidence in this
manner and presenting it at the subsequent trial did not violate the
defendants' rights under the fourth amendment. The Court stressed
that the absence of a physical invasion of petitioners' premises was
as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the
property was illegally seized without warrant ..... The motion
shall be made before trial . . . but the court in its discretion
may entertain the motion at the trial ....
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
4. Lopez v. United States, 305 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1962).
5. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
6. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
7. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
8. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
9. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5.
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a vital factor in its decision. The telephone connections were made
with no trespass upon the property of the defendants. 1 0
In the On Lee case 1 1 a special employee, 1 2 acting in an undercover
capacity for the United States Bureau of Narcotics, engaged On Lee,
a long time acquaintance of his, in conversation in On Lee's laundry
shop. The special employee was carrying a concealed radio trans-
mitter and as On Lee talked, making self-incriminating statements
involving the traffic in narcotics, his voice was picked up by a federal
narcotics agent who was standing outside On Lee's shop, equipped
with a radio receiver tuned to the transmitter carried by the special
employee. The special employee never testified at On Lee's trial but
the agent testified as to what he heard over the radio receiver. On
Lee maintained that the evidence was obtained in violation of his
rights under the fourth amendment, amounting to an unlawful search
and seizure. In a divided opinion, the Court held that the conduct of
the Government did not amount to a search and seizure as is pro-
scribed by the fourth amendment. No trespass was committed by the
special employee; he went into On Lee's shop with the consent, if not
by the implied invitation, of On Lee.' 3
In Goldman,1 4 federal agents placed a detectaphone against a wall
to enable them to hear conversations taking place in the next room.
Petitioner claimed his rights under the fourth amendment had been
violated by the federal agents and tried to distinguish his case from
Olmstead,' 5 stating that when one speaks over a telephone he intends
that his voice will carry over a long distance but that when one speaks
in the privacy of his own home or office, he intends that the sounds
remain there. The Court declined to distinguish the cases on their
facts and held that because there had been no trespass committed,
the defendants' rights under the fourth amendment had not been
violated. The Court went on to state that there had been in fact a
10. The Olmstead case was decided well before enactment of § 605 of
the Federal Communications Act, which provides in part: "No person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such
intercepted communication to any person." 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934). Had Olmstead
arisen after the wiretap statute, its facts would most certainly have brought
it within the scope of such statute.
11. On Lee v. United States, supra note 6.
12. The special employee, from all indications, was a member of the under-
world who was himself quite familiar with the traffic in illegal narcotics and who
had turned informant.
13. On Lee v. United States, aupra note 6 at 751, 752.
14. Goldman v. United States, supra note 7.
15. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5.
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prior physical entry into the petitioners' office for the purpose of
installing a different listening apparatus which had turned out to be
ineffective. 1 6 The Court emphasized that this earlier physical tres-
pass was of no relevant assistance in the later use of the detectaphone
in the adjoining office.' 7
In Silverman's officers in an adjoining house inserted a spike, at-
tached to a microphone under a baseboard until it hit a heating duct
in the premises occupied by defendants. The heating duct acted as a
conductor and the officers were able to hear conversations involving
gambling activities. Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,
stating that although a federal statute' 9 had not been violated, peti-
tioners' rights under the fourth amendment had. The Court went on
to say that Silverman was not overruling Olmstead20 or Goldman2 t
because in the Silverman case, there was a physical invasion of the
premises occupied by petitioners when the spike mike had been in-
serted into petitioners' premises. In Silverman, the Court states:
Eavesdropping accompanied by means of such a physical
intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions in which
a closely divided court has ruled that eavesdropping accom-
panied by other electronic means did not amount to an
invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.2 2
All of the above cited cases have held for the proposition that
electronic eavesdropping, unaccompanied by an unlawful physical
invasion of a constitutionally protected area, is not a violation of one's
rights under the fourth amendment, but each case was closely divided
with strong dissents. In his Olmstead dissent, Mr. Justice Brandeis
recognized that the fourth amendment is primarily a protection of
privacy, pointing out that when the Constitution was adopted, force
and violence were the only known means of compelling the production
of private papers. He went on to state:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy...
have made it possible for the Government ... to obtain dis-
closure in court of what is whispered in the closet ....
16. In the Goldman case federal agents had actually entered the defend-
ants' premises with a microphone which they secreted inside the premises. This
microphone failed to work and it was then that the agents employed the use of
the detectaphone from outside the defendants' premises.
17. Goldman v. United States, supra note 7 at 134, 135.
18. Silverman v. United States, supra note 8.
19. 47 U.S.C. § 605, supra note 10.
20. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5.
21. Goldman v. United States, supra note 7.
22. Silverman v. United States, supra note 8 at 509, 510.
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Ways may some day be developed by which the Government
S.. will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home .... Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasion of individual
security? 23
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Goldman, stated:
The conditions of modern life have greatly expanded the
range and character of those activities which require pro-
tection from intrusive action by Government officials if men
and women are to enjoy the full benefit of that privacy which
the Fourth Amendment was intended to provide. It is our
duty to see that this historic provision receives a construc-
tion sufficiently liberal and elastic to make it serve the needs
and manners of each succeeding generation. 24
Mr. Justice Douglas, specially concurring in Silverman, stated that
he could see no rational difference between the electronic listening
devices employed in Silverman and Goldman and that the invasion
of privacy was as great in one case as in the other. 25
Judge Frank, dissenting in United States v. On Lee, saw even a
blacker picture if the protection of the fourth amendment was not
afforded in a case such as On Lee.2 6 His rationale was that a secret
listening device conducts only an exploratory search for evidence and
that such searches should be forbidden, with or without warrant, by
the fourth amendment. 2 7 Further, Judge Frank stated:
The practice of broadcasting private inside-the-house con-
versations through concealed radios is singularly terrifying
when one considers how this snide device has already been
used in totalitarian lands. Under Hitler, when it became
known that the secret police planted dictaphones in houses,
members of families often gathered in bathrooms to conduct
whispered discussions of intimate affairs, hoping thus to
escape the reach of the sending apparatus. 28
It was against this background of closely divided cases that the
Lopez case was decided. In the view of the majority, Lopez does not
involve eavesdropping at all. The federal agent did not use the re-
23. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5 at 473, 474.
24. Goldman v. United States, supra note 7 at 138.
25. Silverman v. United States, supra note 8 at 512, 513.
26. United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951).
27. Id. at 313, 314.
28. Id. at 317.
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corder to listen in on conversations he could not otherwise have
heard. Instead, the device was used to obtain corroboration of the
conversation in which the Government's agent participated and was
entitled to disclose. Further, Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the
opinion of the Court, states:
[ T] he device was not planted by means of an unlawful physi-
cal invasion of petitioner's premises under circumstances
which would violate the Fourth Amendment. It was carried
in and out by an agent who was there with petitioner's as-
sent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the agent him-
self.2 9
In a special concurring opinion,3 0 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, al-
though agreeing with the result reached by the majority, felt that the
instant case should not be construed as reaffirming the result in On
Lee. Rather he thought that the two cases were distinguishable on
their facts, reasoning that the use and purpose of the radio trans-
mitter in On Lee was not to corroborate the testimony of the under-
cover employee, but rather to preclude the necessity of having him
take the stand. The Chief Justice stated that although it was per-
missible to permit secretly recorded statements to be introduced as
evidence to corroborate an agent's testimony, he could not sustain
the introduction of the same type of evidence, used independently, so
as to conceal substantial factual and legal issues concerning the rights
of an accused and the administration of criminal justice.
In a vigorous dissent 3 ' Mr. Justice Brennan also was of the opinion
that the result in On Lee was wrong, but he could not see any factual
difference between On Lee and the instant case. His view was that
On Lee's trial may have been less fair than that accorded Lopez
because of the withholding of the special employee as a witness but
that the invasion of freedom was the same in both cases. He thought
that the device employed in Lopez was too serious an intrusion upon
one's fundamental and basic right of privacy.
The overriding theme of Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent and the
dissents in the cases treated by the Court as controlling on Lopez3 2
is that the uncontrolled use of electronic eavesdropping by law en-
forcement officers will destroy all semblance of anonymity and pri-
29. Lopez v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1381, 1388 (1963).
30. Id. at 1390, 1391.
31. Id. at 1392.
32. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5; On Lee v. United States,
aupra note 6; Goldman v. United States, supra note 7 and Silverman v. United
States, supra note 8.
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vacy. Further, the failure of the Court to enforce rigidly the stand-
ards of the fourth amendment will make it a party to this official law-
lessness.
The decision in On Lee, the case most analogous to the instant case,
has never been overruled, modified or limited by the Supreme Court. 
3 3
It has been followed by the courts of appeal which have considered
it. 3 4 Lopez, however should not be considered as a reaffirmance of
On Lee. One distinction between On Lee and Lopez is that in On Lee,
the immediate recipient of On Lee's spoken words did not testify and
thus could not be cross-examined, whereas in Lopez, the agent to
whom petitioner spoke testified and was cross-examined. The dis-
tinction is an important one since even the most innocuous conversa-
tion can sound incriminating if the setting and mood of the conver-
sation is not apparent. The inflection in one's voice may not be
noticeable to one who is listening by way of an electronic device. The
look on one's face may belie the words he utters, but this would never
be known by the listener to a recording or a radio-transmitted con-
versation.
Another distinction between the two cases is that in On Lee the
special employee appeared to be on a fishing expedition for those who
directed his activities. The agents were endeavoring to procure more
evidence of On Lee's trafficking in narcotics. In Lopez, the agent was
there with a specific purpose - to obtain the most trustworthy and
accurate corroboration available of the attempted bribe, which had
already been communicated to the agent. The only discernible differ-
ence between a person's testimony in regard to a conversation in
which he participated and an electronic recording of the same con-
versation is that the recording has the advantage of furnishing trust-
worthiness to the person's testimony. The risk of disclosure is always
present, regardless of eavesdropping by any third person. 3 5
There is in the instant case, as perhaps there is in most such cases,
an unspoken suggestion that the use of electronic eavesdropping to
secure evidence is per se improper, that it is a dirty business, and that
the intrusion of the recording device taints the law enforcement
activity. The proponents of electronic eavesdropping maintain that
33. See Silverman v. United States, supra note 8 at 508.
34. See e.g., Anspach v. United States, 305 F.2d 48 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962); Todisco v. United States, 298 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 803 (1962); United States v. Finazzo, 288
F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 837 (1961); cf. Carnes v. United
States, 295 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 861 (1962).
35. Cf. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
19631
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
there is nothing inherently objectionable about the use of such re-
cording devices as long as the prying for which they substitute is
not offensive. Their cry is that it is a necessary weapon to use in the
war against crime as it exists in today's modern world.3 6
The opponents plead that the resulting deprivations of privacy,
brought on by the use of electronic surveillance, reeks of totalitar-
ianism. 3 7
Even though the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of peti-
tioner, the importance of the Lopez decision is not that the Court has
extended or even followed closely settled law as established in the
leading cases in the electronic eavesdropping field, but rather that
the force, authority and vitality that Olmstead, Goldman, Silver-
man, 38 and especially On Lee,3 9 once had, has been diminished. The
majority apparently refuses to acknowledge that Lopez entails eaves-
dropping per se, thereby skirting somewhat the issue involved in the
On Lee case. The special concurring opinion and the dissent categori-
cally state the decision in On Lee was wrong. The Supreme Court is
aware that with the tremendous scientific advances in electronic
listening devices, the age of privacy is rapidly disappearing. By
extending the protection of the fourth amendment to flagrant abuses
in the electronic eavesdropping field the Supreme Court will be assur-
ing that respect for the Constitution and the law will be greatly en-
hanced.
Lopez has brought the Supreme Court one step closer to applying
the sanctions of the fourth amendment to these type of cases. This
is not to say, however, that all cases involving electronic eavesdrop-
ping should be banned by the fourth amendment, but as Mr. Chief
Justice Warren states in Lopez:
However, I do not believe that as a result, all uses of such
devices should be proscribed either as unconstitutional or as
unfair law enforcement methods. One of the lines I would
draw would be between this case and On Lee.40
36. Silver, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Prosecutor's View,
44 MINN. L. REV. 835, 844 (1960).
37. Hennings, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Legislator's
View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 813 (1960).
38. Olmstead v. United States, supra note 5; Goldman v. United States,
supra note 7; Silverman v. United States, supra note 8.
39. On Lee v. United States, supra note 6.
40. Lopez v. United States, supra note 29 at 1389.
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CORPORATIONS - Stock Transfer Restrictions - First option agree-
ment providing for nominal option price unrelated to fair value at
the time of agreement.
In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
In 1939 three of the four shareholders of a closely held family corpo-
ration entered into a written agreement which required that upon
the death of any party, or in the event any party desired to offer his
shares for sale during his life, such party's shares be offered to the
others in equal proportions at one dollar per share. In the event such
shares were not purchased by the others, then the holder or his
personal representative would have the right to sell them upon the
open market.' The fair value of each share at the time of the agree-
ment was fifty dollars or more.
One of the parties died in 1953 and the other two availed themselves
of the option as provided for by the agreement. In 1959 one of the
two remaining parties died and the survivor tendered to the personal
representatives $501 for the purchase of 501 shares held by the dece-
dent. At the time of tender each share had a book value $599.33, and
its fair value was not less than $1,060. The personal representatives
refused to comply with the agreement and the surviving shareholder
brought this action for specific performance. The trial court granted
the requested relief. On appeal, held, affirmed, one justice dissenting.
The court held that the agreement was a limited and not an absolute
restriction on sale and was therefore not an unreasonable restraint
on alienation, and, where made between mature members of a family
would not be invalidated or its specific performance defeated because
of discrepancy between the sale price and fair value without over-
reaching, fraud or deceit.
Shareholders' agreements restricting the transfer of shares are
commonly employed. Such agreements have been enforceable in
Pennsylvania 2 "if in essence and substance, the object they had in
view was neither unreasonable nor opposed to public policy." "Such
provisions are usually viewed as reasonable 'ground rules' in the man-
agement of corporations, especially those of the small closely held
1. This type of agreement is referred to as a first option agreement or the
right of first refusal.
2. Fitzsimmons v. LIndsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 AtL 488 (1903); Lindsay's Estate,
210 Pa. 224, 59 At. 1074 (1904); Beechtold v. Coleman Realty Co., 376 Pa. 208,
79 A.2d 661 (1951); Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78
(1909); Haase Estate, 79 Montg. Co. L. R. 250, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 106 (1962).
3. Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa. Super. 78, 86 (1909).
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type. On the other hand, unqualified restrictions upon alienation are
not permitted .... '"4 An unqualified restriction which is permanent
or unconditional is repugnant to the established public policy which
forbids absolute restraints on the alienability of property, and is
inconsistent with "the concept of ownership as it exists and operates
in the law."5
However, in enforcing stock transfer restrictions in the form of
first option agreements, the courts have generally failed to carefully
analyze the effect of the option price on the alienability. In granting
specific performance of a first option agreement, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts has said:
It is equally well settled that specific performance of an
agreement to convey will not be refused merely because the
price is inadequate or excessive. The difference must be so
great as to lead to a reasonable conclusion of fraud, mistake,
or concealment in the nature of fraud, and to render it
plainly inequitable and against conscience that the contract
should be enforced.6
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, has looked to the
price to determine only if the agreement is unconscionable or indi-
cates the presence of fraud or mistake. 7
Prior to its present decision,8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
had never been presented with an option agreement in which there
was no relationship between the option price and the fair value at
the time of agreement. It had been held that the price could be that
which could be obtained from a third party,9 a fair price fixed by
agreement,1o a price based on book value," a price based on net
worth, 12 or a price arrived at by appraisal.13
In 1957 the Court of Appeals of New York was confronted with a
case involving the disparity between the option price and the fair
4. Hasse Estate, 79 Montg. Co. L. R. 250, 253, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 106, 109
(1962).
5. Id. at 253, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d at 110.
6. New England Trust Co. v. Abbot, 162 Mass. 148, 155, 38 N.E. 432, 434
(1894).
7. Palmer v. Chamberlain, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
8. In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
9. Aiken v. Dickinson, 305 Pa. 176, 157 AtI. 471 (1931).
10. Hacker v. Price, 367 Pa. 250, 71 A.2d 851 (1950).
11. Lindsay's Estate, 210 Pa. 224, 59 AtI. 1074 (1904).
12. Mawry v. McWherter, 365 Pa. 232, 74 A.2d 154 (1950).
13. Ibi.
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value at the time the option was exercised.' 4 There a by-law provi-
sion gave the corporation a first option to repurchase a decedent's
stock at the price at which it had been issued to him. The lower court
granted specific performance. The appellate division reversed,' 5 hold-
ing for the executors, but the Court of Appeals of New York reversed
the intermediate court stating:
As the cases thus make clear, what the law condemns is, not
a restriction on transfer, a provision merely postponing sale
during the option period, but an effective prohibition against
transferability itself. Accordingly, if the by-law under con-
sideration were to be construed as rendering the sale of stock
impossible to anyone except the corporation at whatever
price it wished to pay, we would, of course, strike it down
as illegal. But that is not the meaning of the provision
before us.' 6
The court went on to say:
In sum then, the validity of the restriction on transfer does
not rest upon any abstract notion of intrinsic fairness of
price. To be invalid more than mere disparity between op-
tion price and current value of the stock must be shown. 17
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied upon the holding in the
Biltmore18 decision in determining that specific performance should
be granted in favor of the surviving shareholder in the present
case. 19 While it is true, as pointed out in the court's opinion,2 0 that
the decedent availed himself of the option agreement upon the death
of his brother at the option price of one dollar per share, it must be
readily apparent that where an agreement is invalid because it is in
violation of public policy, no amount of compliance with it by the
parties can ever make such agreement binding or enforceable.
The agreement then must be examined as of the time of its execu-
tion to determine its validty. In Biltmore2 ' at the time the agree-
14. Allen, Ex'rs v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418,
141 N.E.2d 812 (1957). But see Annot., 61 A. L. R. 2d 1309 (1958) and 72 HARv.
L. R. 555 (1959).
15. Allen, Ex'rs v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 1 N.Y. App. Div. 2d 599, 153
N.Y.S. 2d 779 (1957).
16. Allen, Ex'rs v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., supra note 14 at 542, 161 N.Y.S.
2d at 423, 141 N.E.2d at 816.
17. Id. at 543, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 424, 141 N.E.2d at 817.
18. Allen, Ex'rs v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., supra note 14.
19. In re Mather's Estate, supra note 8.
20. /bid.
21. Allen, Ex'rs v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., supra note 14.
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ment was executed, the option price did have some relationship to
the fair market value; in fact, the option price was the price paid by
the decedent which presumably was the fair value at the time. The
option price in the agreement entered into by the decedent in the
Mather case2 2 had no relationship to any value. This is apparent
from the fact that on the same day as the agreement in question was
executed the corporation entered into a buy and sell agreement with
the decedent's sister, who owned the shares not included in the first
option agreement, for a price of fifty dollars per share. The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court failed to discuss this fact in its opinion, and,
therefore, apparently failed to recognize that the agreement involved
more than a mere disparity between option price and fair value. The
agreement is essentially similar to that which the Delaware Court
struck down as against public policy saying:
In the instant case, the restraint is not against aliening to
any one person or to a narrow few . . . . In substance it
borders close upon a restraint against transferring the
property to anyone in the whole world except the corpora-
tion. 23
The agreement in question effectively creates an absolute restraint
against any transfer other than to the remaining shareholders. It
provides for an option price which is unconscionably nominal with
relation to the value of the shares at the time the agreement was
executed.
The brief for the appellant, personal representatives, fittingly sums
up the effect of the lower court's decision which has been affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
If the lower court's view were sustained, the effect would be
that the existing decisions which hold invalid consent re-
straints and restraints prohibiting the sale of stock to other
than a limited group would be obsolete, since a far more
effective means of preventing alienability is now available.
It is merely necessary for shareholders to agree in a by-law
or separate agreement not to sell their stock without first
offering it to the other stockholders at a small fraction of its
value. If the effect of such an agreement upon transfer-
ability and its reasonableness as a restraint are not subject
to examination, an attorney would have a ready answer to
those who ask for an iron-clad prohibition against transfer
of corporate stock, albeit a device in conflict with the tradi-
22. In re Mather's Estate, supra note 8.
23. Greene v. E. H. Robbins, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 403, 2 A.2d 249, 253 (1938).
[Vol, 2: p. 115
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tional policy of free alienability. The attorney would simply
advise his clients that they can agree that no stock can be
transferred without offering it for a dollar to the other stock-
holders, explaining that this constitutes no 'forfeiture' or no
'prohibition' because there is a ready escape, i.e., in the event
that the other stockholders do not elect to purchase at a dol-
lar, the selling stockholder is free to sell. Such a result it is
submitted, would represent a solid victory of form over sub-
stance, legal niceties over logic and common sense.24
Apparently form has triumphed over substance in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania. This decision now makes it possible for first option
agreements to provide in effect that if the corporation or other stock-
holders do not desire to have a gift made to them, the shareholder
wishing to dispose of his stock is free to sell it on the open market.
EMINENT DoMAIN-Reasonable Probability of Rezoning-Valuation
testimony may be premised upon a reasonable probability of rezon-
ing-Evidence supporting the probability must not be remote or spec-
ulative.
Snyder v. Commonwealth, 412 Pa. 15, 192 A.2d 650 (1963).
Under the power of eminent domain, an unimproved parcel of land
owned by George Snyder and Edward Boone was condemned by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for highway purposes. This prop-
erty contained 1 7/10 acres and was zoned residential at the time of
the taking.
Being dissatisfied with the Commonwealth's offer of compensation,
the plaintiffs petitioned for appointment of a board of viewers to hear
testimony and make an award of damages for the taking. The board
of viewers awarded plaintiffs $12,745.37. Both sides appealed to the
Court of Common Pleas where the jury returned a verdict of
$40,000.00 plus $7400.00 for delay in payment.
The Commonwealth appealed from the jury award, arguing that
the condemnee should not have been permitted to introduce evidence
of market value which was based on the theory that the property
had a reasonable probability of being rezoned at the time of the tak-
ing. The main thrust of this argument being that there was not suf-
24. BRmF FOR APPELLANrS, p. 19.
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